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This monograph is an analysis of the interactions between external debt and 
internal  adjustment  in  Turkey  since the  early  1970s. As  an oil-importing, 
middle-income  economy,  Turkey  experienced  a  series  of  external  shocks 
after  1973. Correspondingly,  it went through  a cycle of foreign borrowing 
and  a sequence of  sharply altered policy  phases.  Two important  questions 
arise  from  Turkey’s  experience  in  this  period.  First,  what  were  the 
underlying  reasons for Turkey’s debt debacle in the late 1370s? Our interest 
here  centers  on  the  puzzling  fact  that  Turkey  entered  its  debt  crisis 
considerabIy  earlier  than  most  other  middle-income  countries.  Secondly, 
how can we interpret  the adjustment experience of the Turkish economy  in 
the early  1980s? This question  is of  obvious  comparative  interest as it has 
become commonplace by now to point to Turkey’s example as a successful 
case  of  “life  after  debt.”  In  what  follows  we  will  attempt  to  provide 
synthetic  answers  to both  of  these  questions.  Since this  requires  a  fairly 
broad  view,  however,  our  monograph  can  also  be  read  as an  analytical 
macroeconomic  history  of  the  Turkish  economy  during  the  last two and  a 
half decades. 
We  should  stress  at  the  outset  that  our emphasis  is on macroeconomic 
phenomena.  This  is the  natural  consequence  of  the fact  that  external  debt 
represents the central focus of our narrative. The accumulation and servicing 
of foreign debt are both linked tightly to the relation between national output 
and aggregate expenditures. Consequently we will pay only limited attention 
to many aspects of the microeconomic and institutional structure which have 
no doubt played important roles in the performance of the Turkish economy 
since  1973. This limitation notwithstanding,  we hope to make clear in our 
account that Turkey’s relationship with external debt has set the terms for the 
economy’s growth: debt has acted in turn as an opportunity  and a constraint 
for growth. 
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To provide context and perspective for the assessments undertaken in the 
remainder  of  the  monograph,  we  present  in  this  chapter  an  overview of 
Turkey’s  development in  the  earlier  periods  with  broad  references  to  its 
political, institutional,  and structural characteristics.  Some basic background 
data  on  the  Turkish  economy  are  presented  in  table  1.1.  To  the  reader 
unfamiliar  with the Turkish economy, a quick glance at this  table  may  be 
useful prior to the historical discussion to follow.’ The table brings out the 
semi-industrial  nature  of  the  Turkish  economy in  1985 (see the  shares of 
industry  in  GDP and total  employment) and  presents  the  relevant  growth 
rates  from  1953 to  1985.  We  conclude this  introductory  chapter with  an 
outline of the policy  chronology  for the post-1973  period  and a plan of  the 
monograph. 
1.1  Historical Background 
1.1.1  Institution-building  Prior to the  1950s 
The  Republic  of  Turkey  was  established  in  1923,  after  the  War  of 
Independence following the total collapse of the Ottoman Empire in the late 
1910s. Although  the  newly  founded  state  had  a  claim  on  the  historical 
heritage  of  an  empire,  its  leaders  immediately  turned  to  contemporary 
Western methods and institutions in the early phases of  political reconstruc- 
Table  1.1  Turkey: Basic Data 
A. Major Indicators,  1985 
Population  49.8  million 
Employment  15.9  million 
Unemployment rate  12.6  percent (excluding labor surplus in agriculture) 
GNP  $  53.0  billion (current prices) 
GNP per capita  $  1,064.0  (current prices) 
Gini coefficient  0.51 (1973).  0.50 (1978).  0.525 (1983) 
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tion.  The  first  fifteen  years  of  the  new  republican  regime,  led  by  the 
founding president M. Kemal Ataturk, was characterized by deep social and 
cultural  reforms,  including,  most  importantly,  the  adoption  of  secular 
principles in the political  life of  the country. 
At  the  outset,  the  national  leadership  faced  colossal  tasks  in  the 
reconstruction  of  a  war-torn  and  long-neglected  economy.  Throughout  the 
1920s, the  government  grappled  with  difficulties in  two  sets of  economic 
policy:  (1) the renegotiation and servicing of a huge external debt; and  (2) 
the  dismantling  of  the  remaining  portions  of  the  so-called  capitulations 
inherited  from the  Ottoman  era. As a balancing  factor for political  favors 
received  in earlier times,  the capitulations granted foreign powers the rights 
to  collect  tax  revenue  and  fix  import  tariffs,  which  effectively  limited 
domestic policy initiatives to redesign the foreign trade and fiscal regimes for 
an improved management of  the national economy. 
The externally imposed tax and tariff constraints were largely removed by 
1929. To correct the disappointing economic performance  in the  1920s and 
offset  the  adverse  impact  of  the  world  economic  depression,  Turkey 
instituted a new set of economic policies in the early  1930s, which placed a 
heavy  emphasis  on  import-substituting  industrialization.  Turkey’s 
government-led industrial drive in the 1930s was quite successful in resource 
mobilization,  and  generated  growth  and  considerable  structural  change in 
output. Major investment projects were implemented  within  the framework 
of  the first industrial plan in the  1934-38  period. 
In  the  mid-thirties,  the  government  (along  with  the  ruling  bureaucratic 
elite)  formulated  an  official  ideological  position,  called  etatism  (statism). 
This  position  sought  a  middle  way  between  Soviet-style  comprehensive 
planning  and  a Western-style  market economy  system.  Etatism  assigned  a 
leading role to the public sector in savings generation and in carrying out key 
entrepreneurial  functions  in  industrial  development  and  technological 
improvement.’  The political  appeal  of  this  ideology  eventually  led  to the 
evolution of a particular form of a mixed economy system in Turkey, which 
imparted a considerable antimarket bias in the foreign trade regime and the 
financial system until the liberalization episode of the  1980s. 
The attempts to implement a second industrial plan during 1938-44  were 
disrupted by national defense concerns connected with World War 11.  During 
the  war,  Turkey’s  political  energies  were  consumed  in  maintaining  a 
quasi-neutral stance with  a tilt  toward the allied powers.  Turkey could  not 
escape  the  devastating  economic  effects  of  the  external  environment  and 
faced severe commodity  shortages, black  markets,  and high  inflation in the 
early 1940s. 
In the immediate postwar years, two major factors shaped domestic policy 
and economic performance.  First, Turkey obtained access to Marshall Plan 
aid  to  Europe  and  U.S. bilateral  assistance  programs,  which  were  partly 
based  on  defense  considerations.  The  conditions  of  these  foreign  aid 620  Merih Cellsun and Dani Rodrik 
programs  required,  however,  a  shift  in  economic  priorities  away  from 
industrial development and toward primary production,  as called for by the 
newly  emerging  perceptions  of  the  optimal  division  of  labor  in  Europe. 
Second, against the  backdrop of rising domestic  discontent  with  one-party 
rule, the government (under the second head of state, ismet inonii) initiated 
a change toward a multiparty parliamentary system. 
Given the  intense preoccupation  with political  changes,  a draft five-year 
plan  was aborted  and industrialization objectives were  pushed  aside in  the 
late  1940~.~  Following  a  major  exchange  rate  adjustment  in  1946, 
government  policies  began  to  favor  agricultural  expansion  and  free 
enterprise.  Average  annual  GNP growth  rates  have  been  estimated  as  7.4 
percent,  1.2 percent,  and  7.9 percent  for the periods  1923-38,  1938-48, 
and  1948-53,  re~pectively.~ 
1.1.2  1950-60:  Democratic Party Rule 
In  the  context  of  rising  domestic  dissatisfaction,  Turkey’s  switch  to  a 
multiparty  parliamentary  framework eventually culminated  in the  defeat of 
honu’s Republican  People’s  Party  and  a  victory  for  the  newly  formed 
Democratic Party (DP) in the May  1950 general elections. The mass basis of 
the DP was rural conservatives. On economic matters, the DP’s plan was not 
to plan.’ 
The Turkish economy expanded rapidly in the early 1950s with the help of 
a steep rise in agriculture output (due to favorable weather conditions and the 
extension of  farm land to low-yield areas) and primary exports (partly due to 
the world trade boom  connected with the Korean War).  However,  after the 
massive  crop failure of  1954, the economy entered into a phase of foreign 
exchange stringency and reduced GNP growth, averaging  around 4 percent 
per  year  during  1953-58.  External debt  management  and  domestic  policy 
increasingly  became ad hoc, with a growing reliance on short-term  foreign 
borrowing  and  trade  arrears  (much  like  the  scenario  to  be  observed  in 
1976-77).  The  central  bank  financing  of  public  enterprise  deficits  and 
agricultural  support purchases  resulted  in  high  inflation,  which  eventually 
led  to  the  reluctant  introduction  of  an  IMF-designed  stabilization  and 
devaluation program in mid-1958. This program was supported by a sizable 
package  of  external  financial  assistance  and  debt  consolidation  under  a 
multilateral  agreement. 
To  the students of Turkey’s recent history, a balanced reassessment of  the 
Democratic  Party  administrations  represents,  in  our  view,  a  continuing 
research  challenge,  On  the  one  hand,  DP  rule  in  the  1950s  stimulated 
broader political  participation  and improved the political  status of the rural 
population.  On  the  other  hand,  the  DP governments  became  increasingly 
repressive in the face of  mounting  economic difficulties  and rising  political 
dissent by  the urban elite. The end result was a tragic one for the top party 
leaders and came in the form of  a complete military takeover in May  1960. 621  TurkeyXhapter 1 
Military rule  was  transitional  and  ended  quickly  after  the  adoption of  a 
socially progressive constitution in  1961, which provided more checks and 
balances in the overall political process. 
1.1.3  1963-73:  Experience with Economywide Planning 
From the standpoint of development policy, a notable feature of  the  1961 
constitution was the requirement of formal economywide planning through 
five-year plans and annual programs, the preparation of  which was entrusted 
to the newly established State Planning Organization (SPO). In  the formal 
sense,  the  planning  techniques emphasized  the  consolidated treatment  of 
government  accounts,  balanced  macroeconomic  projections,  sector-level 
consistency  studies,  and  improved  methods  of  project  selection.  While 
providing compulsory guidelines for the public sector, the plans have been 
indicative for the private sector, relying on continually modified mixtures of 
specific incentives. 
With the introduction of  economywide planning, the style and effective- 
ness  of  development  policy  improved  considerably  from  1962 onward, 
exhibiting a greater concern for noninflationary resource mobilization and 
industrialization. Despite the sluggish growth of  agricultural output, annual 
GNP growth for 1963-73  averaged around 6.7 percent as compared with 4.8 
percent  in  1953-63.  During  the  first  and  second  plans  (1963-67  and 
1968-72),  the policy  emphasis on domestic savings performance paid off 
quite well, resulting in economywide marginal savings ratios of  32 and 26, 
respectively, in these two consecutive plan periods. The share of the public 
sector in  total  domestic savings  was  about 45-50  percent,  reflecting  the 
significant role of the government in major development programs. 
However,  the  pursuit  of  development  in  a  planned  fashion  did  not 
fundamentally change the restrictive and  largely ad  hoc character of  trade 
policies, which discriminated against exports. The annual import programs 
(containing devices such as quotas,  licences,  import  deposits,  and  tariffs) 
served as important policy instruments under the successive five-year plans. 
These instruments were used more for limiting imports to foreign exchange 
availability  than  for  evolving  a  selective  and  increasingly  competitive 
import-substitution pattern in the economy.6 
Under  the  prolonged  maintenance  of  an  increasingly overvalued  fixed 
exchange rate regime, the strains on the external balance intensified in 1969. 
To  prevent  the  emergence  of  a  payments  crisis,  the  administration  of 
Suleyman Demirel was persuaded to introduce an IMF-supported stabiliza- 
tion program in August 1970, involving a maxi-devaluation. The liberaliza- 
tion  objectives of  this  program  were  largely  abandoned  after  the  partial 
intervention of  the military in March 1971. 
Concerned with the rising political violence on the left, the chiefs of  the 
armed forces intervened in 1971 mainly to avoid a complete takeover by the 
younger officers. Their proposed policy remedies were the adoption of some 622  Merih Cellsun and Dani Rodrik 
restrictive clauses in the 1961 constitution, and legislation of  socioeconomic 
reforms  to  restore  confidence  in  the  future  of  the  nation.  The  reforms 
suggested by  the military were ill-defined, however, resulting essentially in 
the  passage  of  the  so-called  agricultural reform  legislation,  which  side- 
stepped the  basic  task  of  designing an  operationally feasible  land  reform 
program for the rural sector. Although  it was not  a complete takeover, the 
military  intervention  in  197  1  produced  a  highly  destabilized  political 
structure in the post-1971 period. 
In  the  setting of  a hospitable world  economic environment and  a trade 
boom  in  the  early  1970s, the  1970 devaluation contributed  favorably  to 
export  and  GNP  expansion  from  1971  to  1973.  The  most  notable 
development  in  this  period  was  the  surge  in  remittances  from  Turkish 
workers abroad, whose emigration had accelerated in the late 1960s. In light 
of an  unprecedented rise  in foreign exchange reserves,  an  ambitious third 
plan  (1973-77)  was  adopted  with  far-reaching  objectives  of  import- 
substituting industrialization in capital-intensive sectors. The planned growth 
process  was  then  seen  as  part  of  a  large  national  effort  to  broaden  the 
productive structure of  the country for a more effective integration with the 
European Economic Community (EEC). 
1.1.4  Turkey-EEC Relations 
Notwithstanding the heavy use of  a restrictive trade regime, an  important 
long-term policy choice was made  in  1963-73  as regards integration with 
the EEC. In September 1963, Turkey and the EEC signed the Association 
Agreement,  which  envisaged  two  consecutive  stages  (preparatory  and 
transitional) before  Turkey’s eventual accession to  a  full  member  status. 
Upon the completion of  the preparatory stage at the end of  the  1970s, the 
Additional Protocol was signed in November 1970, which became effective 
in January 1973. This protocol specified the ground rules for the transitional 
stage, which projected the establishment of  a customs union before the full 
membership stage. 
In the Additional Protocol, Turkey agreed to remove gradually tariff and 
nontariff barriers for EEC manufactured exports according to two timetables 
(over  12- and  22-year periods, as differentiated by  products). In  turn,  the 
EEC removed tariff  barriers for Turkish manufactured  exports, except for 
particular product  categories such as cotton yams,  textiles, and processed 
food  items  in  which  Turkey  had  a comparative advantage.  The  selective 
trade advantages granted to Turkish agricultural exports rapidly eroded after 
the EEC’s subsequent agreements with other Mediterranean countries. The 
EEC also agreed, in principle, to allow free movement for Turkish labor by 
1986. 
Until the emergence of a severe foreign exchange stringency in 1977-78. 
Turkey carried out tariff reductions as scheduled in the Additional Protocol. 
Following  the  1978-86  period  of  somewhat  cold  and  strained  relations 623  TurkeyKhapter 1 
(partly  due  to  Turkey’s  internal  political  difficulties),  Turkey  formally 
applied for full membership in the European Community  in mid-1987. 
1.2  Structural Peculiarities and the Mixed Economy System 
Before we embark upon the analysis of the post-1973 phases in detail,  it 
would  also  be  useful  to  draw  attention  to  some  of  the  peculiar  structural 
properties  of  Turkey’s  growth  and  the  major  characteristics  of  its  mixed 
economy system. 
1.2.1  Structural Transition: A Cross-Country Comparison 
Turkey’s historical growth process produced a considerable change in its 
economic  structure.  However,  in some ways, this structural change lagged 
behind  the  norms  (or  standards)  predicted  for  countries  at  Turkey’s 
population  size and income level. The leads and lags in structural transition 
are  helpful  in  identifying  the  areas  where  special  policy  and  nonpolicy 
factors  were  at  work  in  the  growth  process.  A  convenient  analytical 
framework  for  such  a  comparative  analysis  of  structural  trends  is  the 
cross-country regressions  of Chenery  and  Syrquin  (1979, which  bring  out 
the  average  (or normal)  patterns  of  development  over time.  Chenery  and 
Syrquin  examine  the  observed  shifts  in  development  characteristics  as 
functions of  per capita income for various country  groupings differentiated 
by population  sizes andlor net resource inflows. 
By making use of Chenery and Syrquin’s regressions (for large countries), 
an  earlier  study  by  Cellsun  (1983)  compared  Turkey’s  actual  structural 
change with that of  an average country with size (measured by  population) 
and  per  capita  income  similar  to Turkey  for  the  benchmark  years  1953, 
1963, 1973, and  1978. Table 1.2 presents a selective summary of the results 
of this study.7 The data shown in this table point to a number of peculiarities 
in  the  form  of  notable  deviations  of  actual  values  from  predicted 
cross-country norms during the  1953-78  period. Turkey performed substan- 
tially  below  the  predicted  norms  in  the  accumulation  of  capital  and 
restructuring  of  domestic  demand  and  production  in  the  1950s and  early 
1960s.  However,  unlike the preceding  ten  years, the  1963-73  decade  saw 
(under economywide planning) a considerable catching up in the accumula- 
tion and industrialization processes. 
In  turn,  external  trade  ratios  were  far  below  the  cross-country  norms 
throughout  1953-78.  This clearly  indicates  the  inward-orientation  of  Tur- 
key’s  past  development  strategy.  This  finding  is  supported  by  a  further 
analysis of the sources of growth, carried out for the manufacturing sector and 
summarized in table  1.3. Compared with other industrializing countries, the 
demand side effects of external trade have been very small in the expansion 
of Turkish manufacturing in comparison with domestic demand. 624  Merih Celisun and Dani Rodrik 
Table 1.2  Resource Accumulation and Allocational Processes,  1953-78* 
Actual  Predictedb 
1953  1963  1973  1978  1953  1963  1973  1978 
A.  Accumulation (lo of  GDP) 
I. lnvestment 
a.  Savings 
b.  Gross investment 
c. Capital inflow' 
2.  Government Revenue 
a.  Government* 
b.  Taxd 
B.  Allocation (% of GDP) 
1. Domestic demand 
a. Gross investment 
b.  Public consumption 
c. Private consumption 
d.  Food consumption 
2.  Production 
(value added at factor cost) 




a.  Imports 
b.  Exports 
c. Primary exports 
d.  Manufacturing exports 
e.  Service exports 
3.  Trade 
C. Labor allocation 
1. lo Share of: 
a.  Primary labor 
b. Industry labor 






































































































































































Source:  Cellsun (1983). 
a Definitions and measurements follow Chenery and Syrquin (1975,  180-87). 
Predicted shares may not add to appropriate totals; from basic regressions in Chenery and Syrquin (1975). 
Capital inflow is net imports of goods and nonfactor services. 
Central plus local government revenue,  excluding savings bonds and public  factor  income.  Tax  revenue  in( 
Includes manufacturing and construction. 
SEE corporate taxes. 
:ludes 
Another structural peculiarity  pertains to the pattern of  sectoral allocation 
of  labor in the Turkish economy. Despite the rapid growth of manufacturing, 
the  share  of  industry  (including  construction,  as  in  table  1.2) in  total 
employment has remained  significantly  below  cross-country  standards.  The 
counterpart of  this development has been the very slow pace of  reduction in 
the share of  primary labor in total employment. In the Turkish setting, where 
mining  has  a  negligible  share  in  employment,  primary  labor  largely 
corresponds  to  agricultural  employment.  This  structural  peculiarity,  com- 625  TurkeyEhapter 1 
Table  1.3  Sources of Manufacturing Gross Output Increase Over Time: An Intercountry 
Comparison" (in percentages) 
Avereage Manufacturing 
Output Growth Rate  Domestic Demand  Export  Import  Change in 1-0 
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Sourre:  Kubo and Robinson (1979); Lewis and Urata (1983) for Turkey, 1973-81. 
'The  sources of growth contributions (based on share-total method) in columns 2-5  are measured as percentages of 
the increment in manufacturing gross output during the indicated periods,  and add up to  100 percent. 
bAll sectors. 
bined  with  more  normal  patterns  of  sectoral  production,  leads  to  large 
income differentials among sectors and widens the overall income inequality 
(as elaborated further in chap. 5).' 
Our review of Turkey's  structural trends suggests that a basic concern of 
development policy in the  1970s should have been the attainment of a more 
normal  trade orientation  in the growth process,  even in the absence of the 
external  shocks  of  the  mid-1970s.  With  a  more  vigorous  exploitation  of 
Turkey's comparative advantage, such a policy shift would have generated a 
larger  labor absorption  in  nonprimary  sectors.  Furthermore, the  prolonged 
maintenance of inward-orientation produced rigidities in the output structure, 626  Merih Celasun and Dani Rodrik 
which would require large real devaluations and wage cuts to accommodate 
the trade-liberalization objectives of the post- 1980 adjustment  program. 
1.2.2  Turkey’s Mixed Economy System Prior to 1980 
An  analysis  of  macroeconomic  adjustment  and  debt  in  the  post-1973 
period also requires  an awareness  of  the  scope and  structure  of  the public 
sector and the financial system in Turkey’s mixed  economy framework. In 
section  1.1.1  we  noted  the  emergence  of  etatism  as  Turkey’s  systemic 
response to the developmental  challenges of the interwar period. Under the 
political conditions  of  the time, an ovemding concern with  self-sufficiency 
led  to  the  establishment  of  government-owned  and  operated  public 
enterprises,  not  only  in  social  overhead  and  services  sectors,  but  also in 
mining and practically all branches of the manufacturing  sector. 
Although  they  were established  as a temporary  vehicle  for industry-led 
growth, public enterprises have nevertheless become firmly entrenched in the 
national economy. After the switch to a multiparty  political system in  1950, 
they served as institutional tools for job creation, regional development, and 
other extra-market  interventions  on social  grounds.  During  1963-77,  the 
share  of  the  public  sector  in  the  value  added  of  large  manufacturing 
(including  firms  with  more  than  ten  workers)  was  around  45  percent. 
Similarly,  from  1963 to  1977, the  public  sector accounted  for about  45 
percent  of  total  fixed  investment  in  manufacturing  and  50-55  percent  of 
total  investment  in  the  economy.  In  the  post-1970 period,  however,  the 
economy  started to  witness  an increasingly  more  vigorous  involvement  of 
the private sector in industrial activity. 
The entrenched position of the public sector in the growth process created 
strains  in  the  financial  system.  Public  enterprises  often  required  large 
budgetary transfers, funding from the social security institutions, and deficit 
financing  from  the  central bank.  In  such  a  milieu,  the  financial  system 
exhibited a highly segmented pattern of growth, requiring financial resources 
to  flow  through  administered  channels.  Because  of  strict  controls  over 
interest rates, the financial sector expanded mainly through the rapid growth 
of its monetary component (including central bank and deposit banks) on the 
basis of an unusually large credit usage by public administration  and public 
enterprises.’ 
Table  1.4 provides data on the structural properties of Turkey’s financial 
system for the benchmark  years  1970, 1975, and  1980.’’  Besides  showing 
the predominant  share of  the  monetary  system  within  the overall financial 
sector, the data also bring out the relatively small volumes of the equity and 
bond  issues  by  the  real  sectors, reflecting  the virtual  absence of  a capital 
market in Turkey in the pre-1980 period.  With the limited  scope for equity 
and  bond  financing,  private  firms  relied  on deposit banks  and  their own 
resources for capital formation. This situation led to the evolution of  sellers’ 
markets  for  bank  credits,  large  spreads  in  interest  rates,  and  strong 627  TurkeyKhapter 1 
Table 1.4  Turkey’s Financial System, 1970-80 
1970  1975  1980 
Total assets of  financial institutions (S  of  GNP)  76.1  80. I  66.6 
Distribution of  assets 
1. Monetary system (Central bank and deposit banks)  68.4  73.3  84.7 
2.  Investment banks  12.4  11.5  6.3 
3.  Social insurance institutions  14.4  11.8  6.4 
4.  Other institutions  4.8  3.4  2.6 
Total  100.0  100.0  100.0 
Net issues of  domestic nonfinancial (real sectors) 
1.  Total (% of  GNP)  59.7  57.8  47.8 
2.  By sector (%) 
a.  Public sector  48.2  42.9  55.1 
Administration  27.3  23.6  31.8 
Enterprises  20.9  19.3  23.3 
b.  Private firms  37.3  47.6  37.3 
c. Households and others”  14.5  9.5  7.6 
Total  100.0  100.0  100.0 
a. Equities  8.9  11.2  6.9 
b.  Debt issue 
Bonds  11.3  8.6  8.6 
Nonbondsh  79.8  80.2  86.6 
Total  100.0  100.0  100.0 
3.  By type (%) 
4.  Held by (%) 
a. Financial system  87.1  83.9  85.8 
b.  Monetary system  57.0  59.7  71.1 
Source:  Akyuz and Ersel (1984, annex 2) for financial assets;  Akyuz (1984, tables 4.1 and 4.4) for other 
data. 
a Includes agricultural producers and nonprofit organizations. 
Credits, advances, etc. 
preference  for  a  restrictive  trade  regime  to  sustain  high-cost  industries 
established for home markets. 
Thus,  the  simultaneous  use  of  three  major  institutional  instruments, 
namely (1) public enterprises, (2) a restrictive trade regime, and (3) financial 
repression, produced  a highly compartmentalized mixed economy system. 
Prior to 1980, the domestic policy debate centered on the relative sizes of the 
public and private sectors, rather than on the improvement of the integrative 
price and planning mechanisms within the Turkish economy. 
Finally, two remarks on our data presentation are in order. First, the public 
sector concept in our macroeconomic discussions is a broad one, covering 
institutional components such as the central government, local government, 
state economic enterprises, and various adjunct entities. In this context, the 
public  sector  deficit  refers  to  a  wider  aggregate  than  the  deficit  in  the 
so-called consolidated budget of  the central government. Second, it should 
be noted that the interchangeable use of the terms “public  enterprises’’ and 
“state  economic enterprises (SEES)” is not strictly correct under Turkey’s 628  Merih Celiisun and Dani Rodrik 
legal  arrangements.  I’  The  SEEs  constitute  the  largest  subset  of  public 
enterprises  and  are  supposed  to  function  under  commercial  business 
principles.  The  non-SEE enterprises are  viewed  more  as  public  agencies 
involved in the production of public goods in the conventional sense. In turn, 
the SEEs have nonfinancial (operational) and financial subcategories. Since 
our overall concern in the present study is the aggregative analysis of  debt 
and adjustment, we often eschew these institutional distinctions and crudely 
use  the  terms  SEEs and  public  enterprises interchangeably, unless  noted 
otherwise. 
1.3  Policy Chronology and A Road Map 
It  is  possible  to  delineate  in  retrospect  three  major  policy  phases 
subsequent to the first oil shock of  1973. These phases correspond roughly to 
1973-77,  1978-79,  and post-1980. By  way of  introduction, we  present a 
brief overview of these three phases. 
1.3.1  Phase  1 (1973-77):  Debt Accumulation and Postponed Adjustment 
The perceived  need  to accelerate and  deepen the  industrialization effort 
formed the background to the official planning process throughout much of 
the 1970s. Thus, Turkey’s response to the external shocks of  the mid-1970s 
became  one  of  postponed  internal  adjustment,  which  turned  out  to  be 
feasible  through  reserve  decumulation  initially,  and  heavy  short-term 
borrowing subsequently, up until mid- 1977. The largely unnoticed buildup 
of  price distortions in Phase  1 caused not only a stagnation in exports but 
also a rapid rise in the import-intensity of  domestic production. Moreover, 
the government’s external debt “strategy”  promoted overborrowing on the 
part of  the private sector. The latter precipitated a severe payments crisis by 
mid- 1977, when practically all reserves became depleted and available bank 
lines were terminated. 
1.3.2  Phase 2 (1978-79):  Foreign Exchange Crisis and Inflationary 
Response 
During  this  phase,  Turkey  secured  important  debt  reschedulings  but 
lacked adequate flows of  fresh foreign credits to halt  a rapidly  worsening 
position  in  the  balance  of  payments.  With  insufficient  domestic  policy 
remedies  and  uncurbed  monetary  expansion,  the  real  sector  adjusted  to 
import compression via an inflationary process of  output contraction. 
1.3.3  Phase 3 (from 1980 on): Stabilization and Outward-Oriented 
Adjustment 
With the introduction of  a mix of  stabilization and liberalization policies 
in  January  1980  and  thereafter,  the  economy  embarked  upon  a  new 
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forces.  Turkey received  sizable volumes  of new  lending and debt relief  in 
1980-84.  The  new  policy  stance  produced  an  export-led  recovery  and 
acceptable degree of creditworthiness by  1982-83,  just as most of the LDC 
debtors were entering a deep crisis phase in their development process. After 
the termination of debt relief in 1984, Turkey began to face an increase in its 
external debt service.  This strained the fiscal position and required  a large 
rise in domestic borrowing at high real rates of interest. 
1.4  Plan of the Monograph 
Our  monograph  is  organized  in  two  parts.  Following  the  broad 
retrospective provided  on Turkish economic development  in this chapter, in 
part  1  (chapters  2  to  5)  we  examine  the  aggregate  performance  and 
adjustment  patterns  from  1973  to  1986.  These  chapters  constitute  an 
analytical  chronology  of  the  policy  phases  outlined  above.  In  part  2 
(chapters 6 to  10) we focus on selected aspects of  internal adjustment and 
external  debt.  Chapter  6 presents  the  principal  findings  of  a  multisector 
general  equilibrium  analysis  and evaluates  the  interactions  among external 
borrowing, trade liberalization, and exchange rate policy. Chapter 7 explores 
in  greater  detail  the  sources  of  Turkey’s  export  boom  in  the  post-1980 
period.  In  chapters  8  and  9  we  assess  public  finance  and  external  debt 
management,  respectively.  In  chapter  10, we  recapitulate  our conclusions 
and discuss the prospects for the future of  debt management  in Turkey. An 
appendix contains a political chronology, as well as supplementary tables on 
subjects covered in the main text of the monograph. 
2  Economic Boom and Debt 
Crisis, 1973 -  77 
For the Turkish economy, the  1970s were the best of times and the worst of 
times.  The  decade  witnessed  an  unprecedented  spurt  of  investment  and 
growth  until  about  1977,  accompanied  by  what  looked  like  a  steady 
improvement  in  income  distribution.  That  was  followed  by  a crash  which 
was  equally  unprecedented.  From  mid-1977  on, Turkey  found  itself  in  a 
monumental  debt  crisis  which  took  several  years  of  intricate  negotiations 
with  creditors  and  a  long  series  of  rescheduling  agreements  to  resolve. 
Growth suffered heavily, with two years of real contraction at the end of the 
decade, and  income distribution  turned  sharply  against  urban  workers  and 
the peasantry. 